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Abstract
At the light of what happened in 2010 and 2011, a lot of European countries founded themselves
in a dicult position where all the credit rating agencies were downgrading debt states. Problem
of solvency and guarantees on the states' bond were perceived as too risky for a Monetary Union
as Europe is. Fear of a contagion from Greece as well was threatening the other countries as Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Ireland; while Germany and France asked for a division between risky and
riskless bond in order to feel more safe.
Our paper gets inspiration by Roch and Uhlig (2011), it refers to the Argentinian case examined
by Arellano (2008) and examine possible interventions as monetization or bailout as proposed by
Cole and Kehoe (2000).
We propose a model in which a state defaults and cannot repay a fraction of the old bond; but
contrary to Roch and Uhlig that where considering a one-time cost of default we consider default
as an accumulation of losses, perceived as unpaid fractions of the old debts. Our contributions to
literature is that default immediately imply that economy faces a bad period and, accumulating
losses, government will be worse-o. We studied a function for this accumulation of debt period
by period, in order to get an idea of the magnitude of this waste of resources that economy will
face when experiences a default. Our thesis is that bailouts just postpone the day of reckoning
(Roch, Uhlig); so it's better to default before accumulate a lot of debts. What Europe need now
is the introduction of new reforms in a controlled default where the Eurozone will be saved in its
whole integrity and a state could fail with the future promise of a resurrection. As experience show
us, governments are not interested into reducing debts since there are ECB interventions. That
clearly create a distortion between countries in the same monetary union, giving to the states just
an illusion about their future debtor position.
ii
Contents
Introduction 1
1 The model 4
1.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.1 Inter-temporal maximization problem for households . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 A function for default losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Inter-temporal maximization problem for the government . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 What happens in the economy at the steady state 14
2.1 Detrending the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Log-linearizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Households'equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Government's equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 System in Matrix notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Results 24
3.1 Impulse Response Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Possible interventions and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4 Conclusions 33
5 Appendix 34
5.1 CRRA utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 Function for Default Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3 Detrending the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6 References 42
iii
Introduction
In 2010 fears that Greece would not be able to repay its sovereign debt start to spread on nancial
markets. Following Greece a lot of countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland were downgrading
by credit rating agencies (CRAs) and a lot of other countries as France were threated of a possible
contagion. Fears of a possible separation within the Euro zone or a possible default of the Euro
area, or possible threats to the European Monetary System were so real. The nance Minister of
Europe approved a rescue package for Greece and also created the European Financial Stability
Facility to prevent a default as well as to return yield spreads to pre-crisis levels (Roch and Uhlig,
2011).
In 2011 Italy adopted a nancial and economic plan, trying to downgrade the level of its spread but
this turns out to be persistently high. After the plan of Monti's government was approved spread
level decreases but after some days it increases again. As Pastor and Veronesi (2010) have argued,
it's protable to use a new policy if the impact of the old one was perceived as unfavourable by
markets (as was in the Italian case); but at the same time, at announcement of a policy change
the discount rate rise immediately because higher uncertainty about the future. Repay the debt
becomes costly more and more. On average investments are cutted and spread level rise quite
rapidly. That's what happened in Italy after the reform.
Literature is so wide and it give us a huge amount of dierent studies to approach the default on
sovereign debts.
Contributions from Lejour et al. (2010) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) give us a good rep-
resentation of the issues and empirics of the situation. In the European Monetary Union (EMU)
the market pricing behaviour changes totally from a convergence trade model to a fear of conta-
gion from Greece, driven by macroeconomic fundamentals and international common risk. As it's
pointed out: there was a double shift in private expectations from a fully credible commitment
to a non fully credible EMU commitment without scal guarantees. EMU needs for structural
and competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and at EMU level monitoring
and policy coordination. But it's more a problem of trust rather than economy. (Arghyrou,
Kontonikas, 2011). According to them, main drivers of the crisis are macroeconomic fundamentals
and contagion; and Greek debt crisis is just a result of a shift in market expectations, deteriorating
the macroeconomic performance, as happened for Mexico (1994-'95) and Argentina (1998).
On the contrary, Ang and Longsta (2011) focused on systemic sovereign credit risk and the role
of Credit Default Swap (CDS) as insurance against default of a country on its debt. They conclude
that a systemic risk may lead to a cascade of defaults but there is more systemic risk in Europe
than was expecting for U.S. and its root has to be found in the nancial market, not in the
macroeconomic fundamentals.
Authors, as usual, ended up with dierent conclusions: for example Greiner et al (2007) have
calculated that current debt levels in EMU member countries are probably sustainable in principle.
But they were supposing a government that takes corrective actions as result of rising debt ratio,
increasing primary surplus to GDP ratio. Their conclusion is that in the long run a high debt to
GDP ratio will have negative repercussion for the growth rate of the economy. As we know the
easiest way to reduce the public debt is to decrease public spending, but countries as U.S. have
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a percentage of public spending to GDP ratio equivalent to 20%, while countries as Italy have a
percentage of 40-50%.
Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000) arm that debt crises may be self-fullling: the fear of a future default
may trigger a current rise in default premia on sovereign debt and thereby raise the probability of
a default in the rst place. Mexico for example had its fundamentals in the so-called crisis zone
and this was linked with a huge loss of condence in the government. When government cares more
about private consumption is more likely to be in the crisis zone.
In this case the maturity of the debt could shrink the crisis zone in which a country could be, even
if a change in the maturity structure is too costly (Mexico had a high debt level with a short-term
maturity structure); but credibility and other policies can just have perverse eects.
Both studies imply, however, that countries would have a strong incentive to avoid default-triggering
scenarios in the rst place. But Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) show that shortsighted governments
fail to internalize consequences of their debt policies for a common ination rate.
Cooper, Kempf and Peled (2010) substained that regional governments, anticipating central bank
nancing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large decits but as
Beetsma, Uhlig (1999) point out: it is hard to imagine the ECB standing by idly, while the debt
pileup in a member country ... leands to debt down- grading or default. The Stability Growth Pact
is not still eective to punish countries with excessive decits while governments fail to internalize
benets from the SGP by reducing debt for a lower future ination level. And countries often think
themselves as too big to fail (Cooper, Kempf, Peled, 2010).
Arellano (2008) built a model in which default equilibria occur and she shows that defaults are
more likely when income is low. In the Argentinian case incompleteness of asset's markets played a
huge role. As substained by Banjeree and Duo (2010), during a recession, a risk averse borrower
nd more costly to repay a debt than default on it: this is why, in part, a government should nd
it optimal to default on its debt, while repay it in boom times is costless.
While all the countries sit in meetings trying to nd a solution for the Euro zone, Cooper, Kempf
and Peled (2010) argued for the impossibility of a policy to eliminate scal spillovers within the
European Monetary Union. There are scal irresponsibilities by some states; there is a huge com-
mitment problem for the European Central Bank that cannot leave members to default scenarios.
They proposed dierent solutions as dollarization that took place in the Argentinian case and mon-
etization that creates free-rider problems and incentives for some agents to erect impediments as
debt restrictions for the future or limits on holdings. Increase of the debt in a region reduce the
capital stock of a federation, impacting on wages, return on capitals and interest rates of the other
regions' agents. They also tried to oer an answer to a possible situation of future taxation but
without money creation.
Starting by the work of Roch and Uhlig (2011) that discuss about equilibrium default and the role
of bailouts, we have built a model where government can default on its debt and this generates a
huge amount of losses that can be recovered only with time. In fact if a government has a bad
performance it's supposed to accumulate debt because of public expenditure, because of expenses
for the management of the state, because of too much investment in the bond market. The idea is
that default doesn't happen immediately but it's a consequence of this bad management: the state
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starts to accumulate losses because of the shortsighted policy (as said in Beetsma, Uhlig, 1999)
and it doesn't take into account the possibility that the European Central Bank cannot nance its
debt. States think that they're too big to fail (Cooper, Kempf, Peled, 2010), so they accumulate
losses until a point in which they need for an ECB intervention. Naturally ECB has to intervene
but the intervention can change with dierent results: if ECB will intervene with monetization this
will create spillovers in the other countries as Cooper, Kempf and Peled (2010) substained, but the
country will get benets and default losses will be absorbed quite rapidly. In the other case if ECB
intervene but proposing a reform these losses will take more time to be recovered.
The literature is considerably larger and every author uses a dierent approach trying to model
the real world situation. We hope to give a contribution to this eld of studies with the aim that
future research will benet from this work.
As suggested by Roch, Uhlig (2011) our idea is that bailout means just post-poning the day of
reckoning. The state knows when it starts to accumulate losses because of bad management and
anticipating this it has to intervene immediately (with a reform, with a change in government, with
change in its policy), to avoid that losses will become too big and ECB must to intervene. Make a
reform when the default is already started doesn't make any sense: it doesn't make things better
as we've seen in Mexico (when the crisis occured was too late to change debt maturity structure).
It's better to solve problems before that they take place, using ex-ante solutions.
We have constructed a model in which there are identical households and there is a government
that is assumed to be benevolent and want to maximize the welfare of the households. We have
constructed a function to measure losses that the government could accumulate if it defaults, since
no one before made it. We're thinking that if a state default it will accumulate losses, period by
period: we cannot talk about a one-time utility cost as sustained by Roch and Uhlig (2011). We're
considering an accumulation of debt out of debt, perceived as unpaid fraction of the old bond that
the government commit to repay. We're going to describe what happens in this economy when
state experience a default and what could be a good solution to default.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the theoretical model that we have built,
Section 2 discuss what happens at the steady state, Section 3 presents all the graphs in order to
show how this economy looks like, Section 4 concludes. There is also an Appendix that is worth to
explain some computational aspects.
3
1 The model
The model combines the approach of Roch and Uhlig (2011), following their specication of the
utility function for the government, using a utility cost of default; and add to this some variables
as described in Arellano (2008) and Cole and Kehoe (2000). We assume that there is a continuum
of innitely living households that get utility from consumption of private and public goods and
invests in the capital market and bonds; and there is a benevolent government that wants to
maximize households' consumption of public goods, levying taxes on capital and labor market,
with the promise to repay bonds.
1.1 Households
The economy is characterized by the existence of a continuum of innitely living households sup-
plying labor to the market. Each household gets utility from consumption of goods Ct while each
household dislikes supplying labor Lt necessary for rm's production. Each household wants to
maximize its utility:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1− 1σt
1− 1
σ
− L
1− 1
η
t
1− 1
η
 (1.1)
where β is the discount factor of the households, u(.) is a CRRA, strisctly increasing, strictly concave
and twice dierentiable utility function. The time-separable utility function has a coecient of
relative risk aversion 1σ for the consumption; σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
ct and ct+1: it describes how households shift conumption from one period to another, trying to
smooth it (for more details see the Appendix 5.1.). 1η is the Frisch elasticity that measures the
substitution eect of a change in the wage rate on labor supply . Using this kind of utility we make
things simplier than using a non-separable in time utility function. The utility of representative
household is pretty similar to that in Arellano (2008) as well as Cole and Kehoe (2000); Yt is total
output (considered as GDP of the economy) and Ct is the consumption of households, where the
government is assumed to maximize welfare. According to Roch and Uhlig (2011), given uncertainty
of future consumption or return on bonds or other investments, a household may discount the future
more steeply than it usually does.
Households' maximization problem is described as:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(Ct)]
s.t. Ct + It +
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 = Bt + Yt (1.2)
where investments are described as:
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (1.3)
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with δ that is the depreciation rate of capital; and households' income (revenues from labor and
capital market) is given by:
Yt = (1− τ lt )wtLt + rt(1− τkt )Kt (1.4)
with:
· τ lt = ρlτ lt−1 +εlt is an AR1 process with εlt ∼ N(0, σ2) , representing taxation on labor market;
· τkt = ρkτkt−1 + εkt is an AR1 process with εkt ∼ N(0, σ2) , representing taxation on capital
market.
The gross return to capital Rt = 1 + rt is the gross interest rate and we assume it's described as:
Rt+1 = Qt+1 + Πt+1 (1.5)
where Qtis the marginal rate of return to capital and Πt is the ination.
Ination is assumed to follow a Taylor rule structure:
βEt (Πt+1) = Πt − kyYt (1.6)
where ky is the coecient that determines the impact of ination on households' income.
Budget constraint of a representative household (HBC=Households Budget Constraint) is expressed
in real terms: it describes which resources are available at time t and how is possible to transfer
wealth across periods using the capital market and investing on state's bonds. Each households
buy a bond in order to repay interests on the old one and has a income Yt obtained both selling
labor to rms and getting revenues on investments on the capital market. With their incomes
each household has a private consumption Ct , invests in the capital market, buy bond of the
government; but has to pay the taxes levied by the government on labor and capital markets
We also assume that the production function of rms where households supply their labor takes
the form of a Cobb-Douglas where:
Yt = AtL
α
t K
1−α
t (1.7)
with:
· wt = ∂Yt∂Lt = αAt
(
Kt
Lt
)1−α
the real wage, as marginal product of labor;
· Qt = ∂Yt∂Lt = (1−α)At
(
Lt
Kt
)α
the rental rate on capital stock, as marginal product of capital;
· At+1 = ρaAt + εat+1 follows an AR1 process with εat ∼ N(0, σ2) , representing the technology
process;
· α the fraction of labor in the production function (and consequently 1− α is the fraction of
capital in the production function)
Notice also that:
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Rt =
[
(1− α)At
(
Lt
Kt
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
HBC can be re-written as:
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 = Bt + [(1− τ lt )wtLt + rt(1− τkt )Kt] (1.8)
1.1.1 Inter-temporal maximization problem for households
The intertemporal maximization problem of the government can be written as:
L =Et
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1− 1σt
1− 1
σ
− L
1− 1
η
t
1− 1
η
+ ∞∑
t=0
βt+1
C1− 1σt+1
1− 1
σ
−
L
1− 1
η
t+1
1− 1
η
+ ∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Bt+
+ (1− τ lt )wtLt + rt(1− τkt )Kt − Ct −Kt+1 + (1− δ)Kt −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1]+
+
∞∑
t=0
βt+1λt+1[Bt+1 + (1− τ lt+1)wt+1Lt+1 + rt+1(1− τkt+1)Kt+1+
− Ct+1 −Kt+2 + (1− δ)Kt+1 −
Rt+1
Πt+1
Bt]
}
(1.9)
Now we can proceed solving household's intertemporal optimization problem.
F.O.C.s
for private consumption:
∂L
∂Ct
= Et
(
βtC
− 1
σ
t − βtλt
)
= 0
λt = C
− 1
σ
t (1.10)
for labor:
∂L
∂Lt
= Et
[
(−)βtL
− 1
η
t + β
tλt(1− τ lt )wt
]
= 0
L
− 1
η
t = λt(1− τ lt )wt
λt =
L
− 1
η
t
wt(1− τ lt )
(1.11)
for bond:
∂L
∂Bt
= Et
[
βtλt − βt+1λt+1 Rt+1Πt+1
]
= 0
λt = βEt(λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
) (1.12)
for capital:
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∂L
∂Kt+1
= Et
{
(−)βtλt + βt+1λt+1[rt+1(1− τkt+1) + (1− δ)]
}
= 0
λt = βEt
{
λt+1[rt+1(1− τkt+1) + (1− δ)]
}
(1.13)
where Pt+1Pt is the gross ination rate and is equal to Πt+1 = 1 + πt+1.
Now, using F.O.C.s of bond (eqn.(1.12)) and capital (eqn.1.13)), that are:
λt = βEt(λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
λt = βEt
{
λt+1[rt+1(1− τkt+1) + (1− δ)]
}
We observe that:
Rt+1
Πt+1
= [rt+1(1− τkt+1) + (1− δ)] (1.14)
Rt+1 = Πt+1[rt+1(1− τkt+1) + (1− δ)] (1.15)
Plugging the F.O.C. for consumption into that of bonds, that means using eqn. (1.10) we get:
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt
[
C
− 1
σ
t+1
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)]
(1.16)
This is the Euler equation; it describes the behaviour of consumption that obviously depends on
interest rate and ination.
Now substituing for Rt+1 we get:
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt
[
C
− 1
σ
t+1
[rt+1(1−τkt+1)+(1−δ)]
Πt+1
]
Since we know that λt = C
− 1σ
t and λt =
L
− 1
η
t
wt(1−τ lt)
, then:
C
− 1
σ
t =
L
− 1
η
t
wt(1− τ lt )
(1.17)
from which we can get the relationship between consumption and labor, that we will plug later in
our system of equations after having log-linearized it.
Plugging this into Euler equation:
L
− 1
η
t
wt(1−τlt)
= βEt
[
L
− 1
η
t+1
wt+1(1−τlt+1)
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)]
L
− 1
η
t = βEt
[
L
− 1
η
t+1
wt(1− τ lt )
wt+1(1− τ lt+1)
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)]
(1.18)
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and substituting for wt the equation becomes:
L
− 1
η
t = βEt
L− 1ηt+1 (1− τ lt )(1− τ lt+1)
αAαt
(
Kt
Lt
)1−α
αAαt+1
(
Kt+1
Lt+1
)1−α (Rt+1Πt+1
) (1.19)
L
− 1
η
t = βEt
L− 1ηt+1 (1− τ lt )(1− τ lt+1)
Aαt
(
Kt
Lt
)1−α
Aαt+1
(
Kt+1
Lt+1
)1−α (Rt+1Πt+1
) (1.20)
L
− 1
η
t = βEt
L− 1ηt+1T Aαt
(
Kt
Lt
)1−α
Aαt+1
(
Kt+1
Lt+1
)1−α (Rt+1Πt+1
) (1.21)
having dened T =
(1−τ lt)
(1−τ lt+1)
.
1.2 Government
The Government is benevolent and is assumed to maximize welfare, providing all public goods that
households need. Its utility function is what Roch and Uhlig (2011) called felicity function, accord-
ing to the interpretation that utility represents preferences of the policy maker. The government
wants to maximize:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
G1−γt
1− γ − χtz
]
(1.22)
where β is the discount factor and u(.) is a CRRA strictly increasing, strctly concave and twice
dierentiable function, whereγ is the coecient of relative risk aversion into provide public goods
for households. Gt stands for public expenditure, since the government provides public goods and
services to the households and we want to examine better their idea to model the cost of a default.
Changing the interpretation, we talk about costs of default, having constructed a function χt to
model losses from default, where z is a binary variable that takes values of 0 in case of non-default
and 1 in case of default. While in Roch and Uhlig there was a one-time utility cost of default
that was depending on past defaults of the state, here we're taking into consideration a series of
losses that government starts to accumulate over time, given a bad management of the state. We
cannot talk about a one-time utility cost as Roch and Uhlig (2011): it's not correct. We're talking
about costs: if a state defaults it will not recover its loss in the next period but it must need more
time. In fact if a state is going to default it will not be able to repay at least a fraction of its old
debt. In this mechanism the state will accumulate interests that it has to pay on its bonds, and
the future ones won't be enough to recover previous losses. We will have a look in the following
section. Government maximization problem is:
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max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
G1−γt
1− γ − χtz
]
s.t. Gt+
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 = Bt + Tt(1− ϕt)− χtz (1.23)
where:
· Tt = [τ ltwLt + τkt (rt − δ)Kt ] is the output that government gets from taxation;
· χt = s(RtΠtBt−1 − Bt) is the amount of losses that government must minimize if a default
scenario takes place;
whit:
· s the fraction of the old bond that government cannot repay if default takes place;
· τ lt ,τkt are AR1 processes of taxation, as anticipated before;
· ϕt = ρϕϕt−1 + εϕt is an AR1 process with ε
ϕ
t ∼ N(0, σ2), representing the fraction of house-
holds' output that escape from taxation;
In the budget constraint of the government that is expressed in real terms (GBC=Government
Budget Constraint) Gt is the level of expenses for providing public goods that are nanced both
through taxes and also bonds Bt that are oered to households through institutional investors.
Government extracts money from households levying taxes Tt on labor (τ
l
t ) and capital (τ
k
t ) markets
and we have introduced a parameter ϕt to take into account the shadow economy: in fact there is
a fraction of labor and capital that, escaping from taxation, makes the government worse-o. s is
the fraction of the debt on which the government defaults and cannot repay it. Clearly in case of
a non default z = 0 s = 0 , while if default happens we can set dierent values of s (i.e. s=0.05,
s=0.1..). We will see later that for a default scenario the government won't be able to provide the
same level of public goods as in the non-default case.
GBC can be re-written as:
Gt +
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 = Bt + Tt(1− ϕt)− sz(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 −Bt) (1.24)
1.2.1 A function for default losses
Our contribution to literature is a default function, or better, a function to measure default losses.
Contrary to Roch and Uhlig (2011) we don't think that the cost of default is a one-time utility
cost; we think that is better to imagine as cost of default an amount of losses that government
accumulate through time: before the crucial time, in which default is declared and after, until all
losses are recovered. To make clear our idea that losses are too big when a state experiences a
default. To simplify let's think about two cases: the rst one, when the government represents a
good management of the state and in this case it will not get in a nancial turmoil; and the second,
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when the government represents a bad management and the state will get in troubles incurring in
huge losses, for itself and for its citizens.
The function to measure these default losses is:
χtz (1.25)
with:
· χt = s(RtΠtBt−1−Bt) ; as measure of the debt level that the government cannot repay even if
issuing a new debt
· z ∈ [0, 1] ; where 0 stands for the non-default in case of a good management, while 1 is the
default case if bad management of the state.
Default has an history: it doesn't happen immediately and losses start to accumulate from a certain
period until they explode. So we're saying that a government could have losses both before the
default date and also after this time.
In fact:
∞∑
t=0
χt =
∞∑
t=0
s(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 −Bt)
where s is the fraction of the debt on which the government default.
Our point is that each state needs to default before accumulate losses: the government should
know it and ex-ante it can save itself and its citizens from a disaster. This in part support the
idea that Argentina made well in the past; defaulting when necessaire, re-covering losses during
time and starting to grow again. In fact we want to show that since losses could be too big it's
better to default immediately without "postponing the day of reckoning" (Uhlig 2011). When
losses occur they will accumulate over time until a point in which the state needs for an ECB
intevention; through monetization, bailouts, or a programme of the ECB to buy each state's bond.
If a kind of intervention occurs the state will cover all the losses and debts, starting a new cycle
of its economy. The point in fact, as sustained by many authors, is that government knows that
is going to default, but since it's expecting ECB intervention it won't default accumulating losses
and becoming unsolvent. In this way in every period the state need for a transfer in order to cover
the fraction of its debt that it cannot repay. We support the idea that reforms are needed in order
for a state to feel more safe without fear of contagion (that we're not delve into more depth here).
Using Matlab we have a constructed a function, that represents how these government' s losses could
be when the state experience a default. This is our contribution to the topic of default. Our idea is
so innovative because no one examined this aspect before: in the computational part we represent
losses as unpaid fractions of old debt, even if mathematically we can make a parametrization of
this function, that help us to get an idea of the waste of resources in our economy when default
takes place. Future works are needed in order to explore this details and all the consequences that
follows from all possible interventions. For the moment we can construct an idea of how these losses
could be and how it's possible for a government to accumulate debts out of debts, being unable to
guarantee a fraction of the old ones.
The function to measure these default losses is:
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χtz (1.26)
with χt that takes dierent values according to dierent intervals of time as follows:
· χt = ln(t− k + 1) for t ∈ (k − 1, t1) , increasing and concave in t
· χt = −c(t− t1)2 + χ for t ∈ (t1, t3) , decreasing and convex in t
and z ∈ [0, 1]; where 0 stands for the non-default in case of a good management, while 1 is the
default case if bad management of the state.
The parameter c indicates how much faster the function decreases, hence how many time it takes for
the state to recover all the debt losses in case of a bad performance from the government: for small
values of c it decreases slowly, that means the state needs more time to recover losses; while for big
values of c losses are covered more rapidly. (See Appendix 5.2 for computations and properties of
the function).
Default has an history: it doesn't happen immediately and losses start to accumulate from a certain
period k and in a certain moment t1will explode. So we're saying that a government could have
losses both before the default date and also after this time.
Figure 1:
As we can see in Figure 1 consequences of a default could be too big! The government could faces
a waste of resources that will aect all the economy.
In the rst graph we are assuming that there is an ECB intervention as monetization: in this case
the government will cover all the unpaid fraction of old bonds through a transfer that it receives.
Clearly, as pointed out by many authors as Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Greiner et al (2007), Ang
and Longsta (2011) this kind of intervention creates a distortion as an inationary burden on all
the other countries (governments) since we're talking about a monetary union but our work is not
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interested on the inationary consequences, as in the overlapping generation model proposed by
Cole and Kehoe(2000).
In the second graph we were supposing no intervention from the ECB and this implies that the
government must act immediately through reforms (as was the case for Italy and other countries
as Greece as well) trying to re-cover all the losses with its own resources. In other words, the
government cannot repay its debts using a transfer; this will force the government to acknowledge
its limits and act in order to reach a break-even point in its balance-sheet. Also we can see that in
this case government could notice earlier that is going to default and it will take remedies before
losses become too big. This could have no distortion on the other countries except for the fact that
in a Stability Growth Pact the states can punish each other if somebody raises too much debt
(Beetsma, Uhlig 1999), but as pointed out the Stability Growth Pact is not really eective.
Making a comparison between the two graph it's possible to understand two things: the rst one
is that with ECB intervention the government has no incentive to reduce its debt level since it's
waiting for a monetization that surely occurs. In this case losses are rapidly absorbed and our
function is able to capture this realization. The second thing to notice is that without monetization
the government has more incentive to recover losses before they become too big but for sure this
process will take more time since the state needs reforms that takes place as earliest as possible.
1.2.2 Inter-temporal maximization problem for the government
The intertemporal maximization problem of the government can be written as:
L =Et
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
G1−γt
1− γ − s(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 −Bt)z
)
+
∞∑
t=0
βt+1
(
G1−γt+1
1− γ − s(
Rt+1
Πt+1
Bt −Bt+1)z
)
+
+
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Bt + (1− ϕt)Tt − sz(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 −Bt)−Gt −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1]+
+
∞∑
t=0
βt+1λt+1[Bt+1 − sz(
Rt+1
Πt+1
Bt −Bt+1)−Gt+1 −
Rt+1
Πt+1
Bt+
+ (1− ϕt+1)Tt+1]
}
(1.27)
Now we can solve it deriving F.O.C.s;
for public expenditure:
∂L
∂Gt
= Et
(
βtG−γt − βtλt
)
= 0
λt = G
−γ
t (1.28)
for bonds:
∂L
∂Bt
= Et
[
βtsz − βt+1 Rt+1
Πt+1
sz + βtλt + βtλtsz − βt+1λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
sz − βt+1λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
= 0
βtλt (1 + sz) = Et
[
βt+1λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
(1 + sz)
]
− βtsz + Et
(
βt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
sz
)
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λt (1 + sz) = βEt
[
λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
(1 + sz)
]
− sz + βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
sz
)
λt = βEt
[
λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
−
sz
(1 + sz)
+
βsz
(1 + sz)
Et
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
λt = βEt
[
λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
−
sz
(1 + sz)
(
1 − βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
))
λt = βEt
[
λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
+
sz
(1 + sz)
(
βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
− 1
)
(1.29)
where we can make a distinction between the two cases:
· for z = 0⇒ λt = βEt(λt+1Rt+1Πt+1 ) , as was the Euler for households;
· for z = 1⇒ λt = βEt
[
λt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
+ s(1+s)
(
βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
− 1
)
, considering losses from default.
We have to remember that the government faces the same gross interest rate of households, that
is:
Rt+1 = [rt+1(1− τkt+1) + (1− δ)]
Plugging eqn. (1.28) into eqn. (1.29) we will get:
G
−γ
t = βEt
[
G
−γ
t+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
+
sz
(1 + sz)
(
βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
− 1
)
(1.30)
G
−γ
t = βEt
[
G
−γ
t+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
+
sz
(1 + sz)
(
βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
− 1
)
(1.31)
that is the Euler equation for the government; according to which it provides public goods to
households.
Notice that it can be re-written as:
G−γt = βEt
[
G−γt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
+
sz
(1 + sz)
βEt
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
−
sz
(1 + sz)
(1.32)
Eqn. (1.32) is the Euler equation, that shows us how the government shifts its level of public
expenditure between dierent periods, given the possibility of a default. At the steady state it
could be the case that, if default takes place, the level of public expenditure in the future will
decrease since the previous level of expenditure cannot be substained at all. The government in
fact won't be able to repay a fraction of its old debt.
A lot of author as Cole and Kehoe (1996), Roch and Uhlig (2011) at the light of the recent crisis
talked about ination equilibria, default equilibria, equilibria in the crisis zone.
Our contribution is focused on losses that comes from a default scenario. We will see what happens
when default occurs, trying to model dierent situations in order to approach the behavior of the
real world economy.
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2 What happens in the economy at the steady state
To describe what happens at the steady state, before detrending and log-linearizing all the equa-
tions, we rst dene an equilibrium concept.
The equilibrium of our economy is an equilibrium in which:
· households maximize their expected utilities shifting consumption and investments from one
period to the following one, investing in states' bonds in order to nance their private expen-
diture.
· government is benevolent and maximize the level of public expenditure in order to provide
services and goods to the households; but at the same time government is subject to a default
possibility in case of a bad management of the state, and if it's not able to repay the fraction
of the old debts this will have strong consequences on future provision of public goods (we're
not considering consequences as the impossibility to borrow in the future as other models
did).
2.1 Detrending the model
We're assuming as in Campbell (1994) that capital, consumption, output and technology all grow
at a constant common rate. So there is a trend that we describe as:
Gr =
Grt+1
Grt
(1 + grt ) (2.1)
where gr is the net growth level. This trend is assumed to be present also in the public expendi-
ture that government substain in order to provide public goods to households. Now we proceed
detrending the model in order both to remove the trend's eect and also to show absolute changes
in values, to allow potential cyclical patterns to be identied. Most of the computational part is
omitted here (for a deep analysis see the Appendix).
Using the resource constraint of households we can rearrange all the equation to:
Grkt+1 = (1− δ)kt + yt −
Rt
Πt
bt−1 + bt − ct (2.2)
And using the fact that:
· Yt = AtLαt K1−αt = atlαt k1−αt ,
· a
(
l
k
)
= A
(
L
K
)α ≡ ( r+δ1−α)
we can simplify eqn.(2.2) to:
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(gr + δ)
k
y
= 1 +
b
y
(1− Rt
Πt
)− c
y
(2.3)
c
y
= 1− (gr + δ)1− α
r + δ
+
b
y
(1− Rt
Πt
)
c
y
= 1− (1− α)(g
r + δ)
(r + δ)
+
b
y
(1− Rt
Πt
) (2.4)
Plugging the values of parameters (that we will explain later) inside we can re-write eqn.(2.4) as:
c
y
= 1− (0.667)(0.041)
(0.076)
+
b
y
(1− 1.04
1.004
)
and substituting for the bond to GDP ratio by = 0.9 , using values obtained through Datastream
2011, we get:
c
y
= 1− 0.36− 0.036(0.9) = 0.60
where, according RBC (real business cycle) literature, households' consumption is the 60% of their
GDP.
The detrended Euler Equation is:
ct = βEt
ct+1G(− 1σ ),r
[
(1− α)at+1
(
lt+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
Πt+1
 (2.5)
Using the detrended equations for labor and consumption, getting rid of the ination, and using
the fact that at steady state:
· ct = ct+1
· Rt+1 =
[
(1− α)at+1
(
lt+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
= 1 + rt+1
it follows that:
β? =
1
G(−
1
σ
),rR
(2.6)
Detrending the equation of labor, that we get by comparing F.O.C.s the result is the following:
l
− 1
η
t = βEt
l−
1
η
t+1G
− 1
η
,r
t T
at
(
kt
lt
)1−α
at+1
(
kt+1
lt+1
)1−α Rt+1Πt+1
 (2.7)
where T =
(1−τ lt)
(1−τ lt+1)
.
Since at the steady state:
· l−
1
η
t = l
− 1η
t+1 ,
· τ lt = τ lt+1 ⇒ 1− τ lt = 1− τ lt+1 ⇒ T = 1 ,
· at = at+1 ,
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· lα−1t = lα−1t+1 ,
· k1−αt = k1−αt+1 ,
·
[
(1− α)at+1
(
lt+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
= R = 1 + r
then the detrended equation for labor can be re-written in the following terms:
βEt
{
G
− 1
η
,r
t
[
(1− α)
(
l̂t+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]}
= 1 (2.8)
so that:
βEt
{
G
− 1
η
,r
t R
}
= 1
β◦ =
1
G
− 1
η
,r
t R
(2.9)
As pointed above, later all the parameters will be examined one by one.
Our y is the average of GDP in real terms weighted for the number of civilians, in order to get
GDP pro-capita.
The ratio by is obtained through Datastream (2011), taking the public debt that is our B and
dividing it by GDP in real terms in order to approach a real economy setting. Approximately this
ratios for European countries is on average close to 90%.
From the resource constraint of the government we get:
gt +
Rt
Πt
bt−1 =
bt
pt
+ tt(1− ϕt)− sz(
Rt
Πt
bt−1 − bt) (2.10)
g
y
= (1 + sz)
b
y
− (1 + sz)
Rb
Πy
+
t(1− ϕt)
y
g
y
=
t(1− ϕt)
y
+ (1 + sz)
b
py
− (1 + sz)
(1 + r)b
Πy
g
y
=
t(1− ϕt)
y
+ (1 + sz)
b
y
(1−
R
Π
)
g
y
= (1− ϕt)
t
y
+ (1 + sz)
b
py
(1−
R
Π
)
then plugging the value of bond to GDP ratio and substituting for taxation to GDP ratio we get
the nal expression for government public expenditure (g) to income ratio; as expenses to provide
public goods, burocracy, transfers and subsidies of income:
g
y
= (1− ϕt)(0.45)− (1 + sz)0.9 (0.036)
g
y
= (1− ϕt)(0.45)− 0, 032(1 + sz)
g
y
=
t
y
(1 − ϕ) − 0.032(1 + zs) (2.11)
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so that for z=0:
g
y
= (0.85)0.45 − 0.032(1 + sz) ≈ 0.36
and for z=0 and no tax evasion (i.e. ϕ = 0):
g
y
= 0.45 − 0.032(1 + sz) ≈ 0.42
while for z=1, s=0.05:
g
y
= (0.85)0.45 − 0.032(1 + 0.05) ≈ 0.35
while for z=1, s=0.05 and no tax evasion (i.e. ϕ = 0):
g
y
= 0.45 − 0.032(1 + 0.05) ≈ 0.41
Both if there is a default or not, the level of public expenditure will be:
g
y
= 0.382 − 0.032(1 + sz)
.
At the steady state this ts pretty well to a real world economy. The only thing to notice is that the
level of public expenditure is lower than that of RBC (real business cycle) literature, just because
we're considering tax evasion as percentage of taxes that are unpaid by households, both on capital
and labor market.
According to literature, for a case of no evasion the public expenditure to GDP ratio is close to
40%, precisly 42%. The detrended Euler equation of the government is:
gt = βEt
[
gt+1G
−γ,rRt+1
Πt+1
]
−
sz
(1 + sz)
+ β
sz
(1 + sz)
Et
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
(2.12)
or:
gt = βEt
[
Rt+1
Πt+1
(
gt+1G
−γ,r +
sz
(1 + sz)
)]
−
sz
(1 + sz)
(2.13)
Given that at the steady state gt = gt+1:
βR
(
G−γ,r +
sz
g−γ(1 + sz)
)
= 1 +
sz
g−γ(1 + sz)
β. =
1 + sz
g−γ(1+sz)
Rss
(
G−γ,r + sz
g−γ(1+sz)
)
where we can notice that, if a default hit government provision of public goods, the intertemporal
discount factor will change.
As said before, we obtained gy as net public expenditure calculated with interests, while for
b
y we
use values taken from Datastream 2011 as discussed before. The ratio of bond to GDP is B/Y=0.9,
close to the real situation faced by some countries before the Greek crisis took place.
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2.2 Log-linearizations
Now we proceed log-linearizing the model around the steady state, in order to check what happens
around the equilibrium. We refer to the equilibrium dened before to see what happens in a context
in which households and a benevolent government want to maximize their economic activities while
the government can default on its debt or not. We are going to describe both situation: when
default takes place and when not.
2.2.1 Households'equations
In order to be clear we specify each equation for each variable of our interest, after having log-
linearized it:
· Production Function:
ỹt+1 = ãt+1 + αl̃t+1 + (1 − α)k̃t+1 (2.14)
· Wage:
w̃t+1 = ãt+1 + (α− 1) l̃t+1 + (1 − α)k̃t+1 (2.15)
· Gross Interest Rate:
R̃t+1 = λ5Q̃t+1 + λ6Π̃t+1 (2.16)
· Marginal Rate of Return to Capital:
Q̃t+1 = ãt+1 + αl̃t+1 − αk̃t+1 (2.17)
· Capital Accumulation Constraint:
k̃t+1 = λ7k̃t + λ8Ĩt (2.18)
· Households budget constraint (we explicitate for investments):
Ĩt+1 = λ9
(
R̃t+1 + b̃t − Π̃t+1
)
+ λ10
(
w̃t+1 + l̃t+1
)
− λ11τ̃ lt+1 + λ12
(
r̃t+1 + k̃t+1
)
+
− λ13τ̃kt+1 − λ14c̃t+1 − λ15b̃t+1 (2.19)
· Ination:
Π̃t+1 =
1
β
(
Π̃t − kyỸt + ηΠt+1
)
(2.20)
with ηΠt+1 that is the endogenous error term that follows from the expectational term present in
the original equation;
· Euler equation:
c̃t+1 = c̃t + σR̃t+1 − σΠ̃t+1 + ηct+1 (2.21)
with ηct+1 is the endogenous error that follows from expectation as before;
· Labor:
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l̃t+1 = λ3c̃t+1 − ηw̃t+1 + λ4τ̃ lt+1 (2.22)
The coecients are:
· λ3 = ησ
· λ4 = ητ
l
(1−τ l)
· λ5 = QR
· λ6 = ΠR
· λ7 = (1−δ)(1+gr)
· λ8 = IK(1+gr)
· λ9 = RBΠI
· λ10 = (1−τ
l)wL
I
· λ11 = τ
lwL
I ;
· λ!2 = r(1−τ
k)K
I
· λ!3 = rtτ
kK
I
· λ14 = CI
· λ15 = BI
We use data taken from World Bank (2011), to approximate the bond to capital ratio, the public
expenditure to capital ratio and private expenditure to capital ratio for the households. To obtain
the capital to income ratio we refer to r as in Lucke, Wurzel (2011). While we use a gr = 0.005 as
in Campbell (1994). The discount factor clearly depends exogenously by the gross interest rate.
2.2.2 Government's equations
· Government Resource Constraint:
b̃t+1 = λ19
(
R̃t+1 + b̃t − Π̃t+1
)
λ16g̃t+1λ17t̃t+1 + λ18ϕ̃t+1 (2.23)
· Equation for the taxation level:
t̃t+1 = λ1
(
τ̃ lt+1 + w̃t+1 + l̃t+1
)
+ λ2
(
τ̃kt+1 + k̃t+1
)
(2.24)
· Euler Equation:
g̃t+1 = g̃t + λ20
(
R̃t+1 − Π̃t+1
)
+ ηgt+1 (2.25)
where ηgt+1 is the endogenous error term (that follows from the expectational term) in the govern-
ment Euler equation (to provide public goods).
The coecients are:
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· λ1 = τ
lwL
T
· λ2 = τ
k(r−δ)K
T
· λ16 = GB(1+sz)
· λ17 = T (1−ϕ)B(1+sz)
· λ18 = ϕTB(1+sz)
· λ19 = RΠ
· λ20 = βRγΠ
(
G−γ,r + sz(1+sz)g−γ
)
All the AR1 processes are rewritten as:
· Technology:
Ãt+1 = ρ
aÃt + ε
a
t+1 (2.26)
· Taxation on Labor:
τ̃ lt+1 = ρ
lτ̃ lt + ε
l
t+1 (2.27)
· Taxation on Capital:
τ̃kt+1 = ρ
k τ̃kt + ε
k
t+1 (2.28)
· Tax Evasion:
ϕ̃t+1 = ρ
ϕϕ̃t + ε
ϕ
t+1 (2.29)
In order to solve the model through the gensys procedure in Matlab we will use the following set
of log-linearized equation, with the following order:
1. ỹt+1 = Ãt+1 + αl̃t+1 + (1− α)k̃t+1
2. t̃t+1 = λ1
(
τ̃ lt+1 + w̃t+1 + l̃t+1
)
+ λ2
(
τ̃kt+1 + k̃t+1
)
3. w̃t+1 = Ãt+1 + (α− 1) l̃t+1 + (1− α)k̃t+1
4. l̃t+1 = λ3c̃t+1 − ηw̃t+1 + λ4τ̃ lt+1
5. Q̃t+1 = Ãt+1 + αl̃t+1 − αk̃t+1
6. R̃t+1 = λ5Q̃t+1 + λ6Π̃t+1
7. Ãt+1 = ρaÃt + εat+1
8. τ̃ lt+1 = ρ
lτ̃ lt + ε
l
t+1
9. τ̃kt+1 = ρ
k τ̃kt + ε
k
t+1
10. ϕ̃t+1 = ρϕϕ̃t + ε
ϕ
t+1
11. k̃t+1 = λ7k̃t + λ8Ĩt
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12. Ĩt+1 = λ9
(
R̃t+1 + b̃t − Π̃t+1
)
+λ10
(
w̃t+1 + l̃t+1
)
−λ11τ̃ lt+1 +λ12
(
r̃t+1 + k̃t+1
)
−λ13τ̃kt+1−λ14c̃t+1−
λ15b̃t+1
13. b̃t+1 = λ19
(
R̃t+1 + b̃t − Π̃t+1
)
λ16g̃t+1λ17t̃t+1 + λ18ϕ̃t+1
14. βΠ̃t+1 = Π̃t − kyỸt + ηΠt+1
15. c̃t+1 = c̃t + σR̃t+1 − σΠ̃t+1 + ηct+1
16. g̃t+1 = g̃t + λ20
(
R̃t+1 − Π̃t+1
)
+ ηgt+1
We specify again all the coecients:
· λ1 = τ
lwL
T
· λ2 = τ
k(r−δ)K
T
· λ3 = ησ
· λ4 = ητ
l
(1−τl)
· λ5 = QR
· λ6 = ΠR
· λ7 = (1−δ)(1+gr)
· λ8 = IK(1+gr)
· λ9 = RBΠI
· λ10 = (1−τ
l)wL
I
· λ11 = τ
lwL
I
;
· λ!2 = r(1−τ
k)K
I
· λ!3 = rtτ
kK
I
· λ14 = CI
· λ15 = BI
· λ16 = GB(1+sz)
· λ17 = T (1−ϕ)B(1+sz)
· λ18 = ϕTB(1+sz)
· λ19 = RΠ
· λ20 = βRγΠ
(
G−γ,r + sz
(1+sz)g−γ
)
Now we clarify all the parameters, that are dened as follows:
· γ = 0.333 as in Walsh Monetary Policy and Theory (2003)
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· σ = 0.5 as in Campbell (1994)
· η = 3.56 as in Chori, Kehoe, McGrattan (1999)
· α = 0.333 labor share ratio
· 1− α = 0.667 capital share ratio
· R = 1.04⇒ r = 0.04 as in Lucke and Wurzel (2011)
· c
y
= 0.604 as close to RBC literature (where it is 0.60)
· b
y
= 0.9 according to data observed in Datastream (2011)
· δ = 0.036
· I
Y
= 0.23
· I
K
= 0.15
· G
Y
= 0.38 as in the RBC literature, except for the fact that we consider tax evasion
· T
Y
= 0.42 close to RBC literature
· ky = 0.3
· τ l = 0.3 at steady state
· τk = 0.2 at the steady state
· β is endogenously determined and its value depends on values that the interest rate takes
· ρk = 0.95
· ρl = 0.95
· ρa = 0.95
· ρϕ = 0.90
· V ar(εa) = 0.005 , according to Campbell (1994)
· V ar(εk) = 0.0001
· V ar(εl) = 0.0005
· V ar(εϕ) = 0.0003
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2.3 System in Matrix notation

1 0 0 −α 0 0 −1 0 0 0 (α − 1) 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 −λ1 −λ1 0 0 0 −λ1 −λ2 0 −λ2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 (1 − α) 0 0 −1 0 0 0 (α − 1) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 η 1 0 0 0 −λ4 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ3 0
0 0 0 −α 1 0 −1 0 0 0 α 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −λ5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ6 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −λ10 −λ10 0 −λ9 0 λ11 λ13 0 −λ12 1 λ15 λ9 λ14 0
0 λ17 0 0 0 −λ19 0 0 0 −λ18 0 0 1 λ19 0 −λ16
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 σ 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 −λ20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λ20 0 1


Yt+1
Tt+1
Wt+1
Lt+1
Qt+1
Rt+1
At+1
τlt+1
τkt+1
ϕt+1
Kt+1
It+1
Bt+1
Πt+1
Ct+1
Gt+1

=

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ρa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρϕ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λ7 λ8 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λ9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 λ19 0 0 0
ky
β
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
β
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


Yt
Tt
Wt
Lt
Qt
Rt
At
τlt
τkt
ϕt
Kt
It
Bt
Πt
Ct
Gt

+

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

[
εat+1 ε
l
t+1 ε
k
t+1 ε
ϕ
t+1
]
+

0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1
β
0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

[
ηΠt+1 η
c
t+1 η
g
t+1
]
23
3 Results
After the gensys procedure on Matlab, now we can make some comments about our model; we're
now able to describe households' and government's behaviour when default happens and when not.
In our steady state we're expecting that the government will mantain the same level of public
expenditure, just smoothing it between periods. While in a default scenario all levels of public
expenditure and bonds will decrease since the government won't be able to repay a fraction of its
old debt. For what concerns the fraction of the old bond that the government is no more able
to repay, for z=1 we can see what happens using s=0.05 or 0.1, thinking that it's a huge loss if
a government is not able to repay 10% of its old debt. As anticipated this losses becomes really
big if there are no government interventions, since the economy needs more money in its attempt
to mantain high levels of cosumption in all the economic activities. A regime in which a country
continue to borrow more and more in order to repay debts is no longer sustainable. Our point is
that Europe needs reforms. Europe needs also for a ght against tax evasion that reaches higher
percentages in countries as the Est-Europeans, Greece, Italy but it's still present in Germany and
France as well. Some reforms have to be made by european authorities while other has to be made
within each country, with the help of each government. If a state experience a default it will take
time to recover all the losses.
3.1 Impulse Response Functions
We are going to comment how our impulse response functions look like, checking for exogenous
shocks.
Technology shock ρa = 0.005 , z = 0⇒ no default
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We have introduce a positive technology shock of the same magnitude of V ar(εa). At the time the
shock is introduced it has eect on output through the production function. Indeed it raises the
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marginal productivity of labor, leading rms to be able to get the same output with a smaller amount
of labor input. The representative household feels itself more richer because of wage increasing and
it will supply a lower level of labor. This eect can be noticed in the plots, where labor is subject
to a sharp downfall as the shock is introduced. The eect of the shock on ination is persistent
given that it takes a lot of time to came back at the initial level; as can be seen ination is pushed
down. The behaviour of consumpion can be better understood interpreting the Euler Equation in
terms of consumption. The decrease in the marginal rate of return makes future consumption less
protable (the magnitude is determined by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), inducing
household to increase their current consumption.
The government has more diculty to provide public goods also because of a sharp downfall in
the taxation level, that is undirectly aected by technology through wage and labor. The rapidly
increase in the level of investments on the capital market will bring the economy to invest less
resources on state's bonds and the government itself nd diculties to commit itself to a debt
repayment. As the shock eects vanishes after some quarters, with duration determined by the
persistence coecient, the economy faces problem to come back to steady state levels.
Technology shock ρa = 0.01 , z = 0⇒ no default
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What we can observe here is that for a bigger shock on technology clearly all the economy is hitten
more: real wage has a greater increase while labor a greater decrease. This bring households to
make more investments because they feel richer. The level of capital in the market also increases,
even if there is a downfall both in the marginal and the gross rate of return. Strangely, even if
a huge fall in the taxation level, public expenditure is decreasing but not that much. Clearly for
households the consumption level increases since they feel future consumption less attractive.
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Shock on taxation on labor and taxation on capital
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For an increase in the taxation level the economy faces a huge increase in public goods. The
level of investment, consumption, wage has a sharp decrease and also the level of capital invested
in the economy. Since the shock positively hit the marginal rate of return, households reduce
their consumption and save resources for the future: future consumption is felt more attractive.
Households are forced to work more in order get a wage (even if it will be lower). As a consequence
the economy will suer but the productivity of rms will be higher. In a period of high taxation
households consume less resources and they reduce their level of investments on the capital market;
because now they're perceived as too costly. The government support investments on its bonds,
since raise in taxation and now it feels able to commit itself to a future bond repayment.
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Technology shock ρa = 0.005 and default takes place z = 1 , s = 0.05
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For a default scenario the situation could become terrible even if there is a positive shock on
technology. The real wage is directly hitten by the shock and this will bring to a sharp rise on the
investment level. Invest today is more protable because of the downfall in the marginal rate of
return. According to this fact, since the real wage increases also the taxation on labor will increase
since the government could try to extract more resources from workers. Consequently households,
feeling richer than before the shock, will increase their consumption level even if for a small amount.
Again, for a decrease in the marginal rate of return to capital, future consumption is perceived as
less attractive. All the rest of the economy faces a huge downfall in all the activities: there will
be a sharp decrease of taxation and consequently on public expenditure, bond, GDP, ination.
The economy will be hitten forever. This support our thesis that Europe needs interventions and
reforms as we have seen before for the case of positive shock on taxation. An economy like this is
no more sustainable.
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Technology shock ρa = 0.005 and default takes place z = 1 , s = 0.1
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In the case of a bigger shock and bigger losses the situation appears clearly as before, except for
the fact that public expenditure will sharply decrease more and more. Strangely, in this case even
if there is a rise in the real wage, taxation on labor immediately decreases but after some periods
it came back to its initial level and nally it has a downfall.
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Negative shock on taxes as a decrease in taxation
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In this case there is a negative shock on taxation, both on labor and capital and we're also assuming
not so much control on tax evasion. As it is for a government that didn't want to levy taxes on its
households, even if it has experienced a default (similar to the Italian scenario before the change
of government). Consequences of a policy like this could be really dangerous. Since there is less
taxation, even if the state experienced a default, immediately the provision of public goods from
the government has a downfall. It will take a lot of time to come back at the initial level. This
policy gives incentives for households to invest on the capital market (since it's costless) and to
consume more, because of a downfall in the rates of return. Clearly the government cannot commit
itself to repay its debts and that's why the level of its bond is decreasing. In a situation like this is
so dicult to came back at all the initail levels for all the economic activities. If the government
won't intervene this economy surely will fail.
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Shock on ρl = 0.005
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Isolating just the function that are directly hitten, we can see better the consequences of an increase
of taxation on labor. The real wage fall down immediately and households need to supply more
labor force to rms. Clearly for a higher level of taxes investments on the capital market will be
reduced while the state will provide more public goods nanced also through a greater bond with
the possibility of a commitment to a repayment.
Shock on ρl = 0.005 ; what happens if a default takes place, z = 1 , s = 0.1
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Clearly all the economic activities are hitten more: there will be a lower level of public expenditure
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that will be nanced through a lower bond and a lower taxation level. There will be an immediate
downfall in the level of investments and also the real wage will decrease by a lower amount since
losses from default impact all the activities making both households and government worse-o.
Shock ρk = 0.005, z = 1, s = 0.1
0 10 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
taxation
0 10 20
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
real wage
0 10 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
labor
0 10 20
0
2
4
6
x 10
−3taxation on capital
0 10 20
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
investments
0 10 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
bond
0 10 20
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
Consumption
0 10 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Public expenditure
What happens when there is a shock on taxation on capital is similar to that of taxation on labor.
But when default takes place public good provision is lower than before and consumption decreases
according to a downfall in the wage. But the government cannot commit itself to repay a huge
fraction of its bond and this will bring him to issue a lower bond. Investments will decrease but
less than it was for tax on labor, since households feel themselves poorer because of the eect of
taxes.
3.2 Possible interventions and implications
As we have anticipated is so clear that without any intervention the economy, after experienced
a default, cannot come back at the initial level of its activities. After a default took place the
government needs to make reforms and it has to convince itself that it cannot borrow more and
more accumulating debts out of debts. Our function to measure default losses makes clear this
idea and help us to understand how much times it takes for a government to recover all the losses
that it accumulates. From the impulse response functions we can observe that just for an increases
in taxation the government will be able to commit itself to repay the old debt and to provide
public goods. But this in turn has strong implications on households activities as consumption,
investments, wages, labor. What Europe needs now, in order to face the actual fear of a default,
it's a wave of reforms. If a state faces a default, it's clearly dicult to emerge and maybe what it
needs is not a monetization as pointed out by many authors as Cole and Kehoe (2000), Cooper,
Kempf and Peled (2009,2010). Monetization and bailouts just postpone the day of reckoning as
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sustained by Roch and Uhlig (2011). At most some states need for a controlled default where each
defaulting state receives help to apply new reforms, standards and regulations to its activities.
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4 Conclusions
At the light of the recent crisis we have built a model to analyze what happens when default takes
place. This topic could be examined in a lot of dierent ways: we focused precisely on default
losses and we have analyzed how the economy could be shocked if a government default because of
a waste of resources.
We have constructed a function to measure these losses in order to understand the magnitude of
the impact that a default could have on the economy.
No one before have examined this aspect and in particular we have three important ndings: rst at
all, if a state experience a default and there are no interventions from the government, consequences
could be really dangerous and the economy won't reduce these losses in a small amount of time. In
particular there could be the case that losses will not be absorbed.
Second, if there are reforms as in the labor market and in the capital market (as we have considered)
as increase in taxation, the government can provide public goods and all the necessaire to its
households; but they will face a bad period since lower level of wages and investment, decline in
consumption and GDP, because of downfall in the marginal rate of return. But this is the only
case in which the government can commit itself to a debt repayment.
Third, when a state experience a default, increasing taxation, it will be able to nance a new debt
emission but this will bring the state in a hole since it will be forced to commit itself to repay a
new debt in order to repay interests on the previous one. And because of the experienced default
the government could not be sure about this commitment.
More works are needed in order to explore all this details and in particular to focus on which kind
of intervention could be considered the rst best to exit from the so-called crisis zone. We hope
our work is a good contribution to the literature on debt crises, thinking that it will be useful for
future research on this topic.
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5 Appendix
5.1 CRRA utility function
The Constant Relative Risk Averse utility function is:
U(c) =
C
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1σ
− L
1− 1
η
t
1− 1η
for 1σ > 0 and
1
σ 6= 1; for
1
η > 0 and
1
η 6= 1
= ln(Ct)− ln(Lt) i 1σ = 1 and
1
η = 1 .
Takin' the derivative we get:
U ′(C) = C
− 1
σ
t
hence,
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+1)
=
C
− 1
σ
t
C
− 1
σ
t+1
=
(
Ct+1
Ct
) 1
σ
or solving for
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
: (
Ct+1
Ct
)
=
(
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+1)
)σ
Here σ is the elasticity of the ratio between consumption in two dierent periods with respect
to the marginal rate of substitution. By denition is then the elasticity of substitution, which is
constant for the CRRA utility function. σ is a measure of the strength of the substitution eect
that uncertainty induces: households in fact shift consumption from today to tomorrow in order to
smooth it over time.
The same could be said for the Frisch Elasticity:
Takin' the derivative we get:
U ′(L) = L
− 1
η
t
hence,
U ′(Lt)
U ′(Lt+1)
=
L
− 1
η
t
L
− 1
η
t+1
=
(
Lt+1
Lt
) 1
η
or solving for
(
Lt+1
Lt
)
: (
Lt+1
Lt
)
=
(
U ′(Lt)
U ′(Lt+1)
)η
Here η is the elasticity of substitution: it measures the magnitude according to which households
shift their supply of labor between dierent periods. Frisch elasticity measures the substitution
eect of a change in the wage rate on labor supply.
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5.2 Function for Default Losses
Our function to measure default losses is given by:
χtz
with:
· χt = ln(t− k + 1) for t ∈ (k − 1, t1) , increasing and concave in t
· χt = −c(t− t1)2 + χ for t ∈ (t1, t3) , decreasing and convex in t
· z ∈ [0, 1]; where 0 stands for the non-default in case of a good management, while 1 is the
default case if bad management of the state
· c measure how much faster the function is going to decrease: for small values it decreases
slowly, while for big values it decreases quite rapidly.
Figure 2:
In particular, for t ∈ (k − 1, t1), the function is increasing and concave in t:
∂ln(t−k+1)
∂t =
1
t−k+1> 0
∂2ln(t−k+1)
∂t2 = (t− k + 1)
−2 > 0.
t1is the point such that:
ln(t1 − k + 1) = χ
t1 − k + 1 = eχ
t1 = eχ + k − 1.
In order to calculate the area below the function, that give us a measure of losses before the critical
date, we use the integral:
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´ eχ+k−1
k
ln(t1 − k + 1)dt
and we solve it by substitution, acting as follows:
t1 − k + 1 = x, with dt = dx.
What we get is the following:
ˆ eχ
1
ln(x)dx = [xln(x)]e
χ
1 −
ˆ eχ
1
x
(
1
x
)
dx
eχχ− eχ + 1
eχ(χ− 1) + 1
For t ∈ (t1, t3), the function is decreasing and convex in t:
∂[−c(t−t1)2+χ]
∂t = −2c(t− t1) < 0
∂2[−c(t−t1)2+χ]
∂t2 = −2c < 0.
We want to nd the point in which the function intersects again the axis and reach a value of 0
(i.e. all the losses are covered), that is exactly in t2. In fact t2is the point such that:
−c(t− t1)2 + χ = 0
−ct2 + 2ctt1 − ct21 + χ = 0.
t =
ct1±
√
ct21+c(−ct
2
1+χ)
c
= t1 ± [ct
2
1+c(χ−ct
2
1)]
1
2
c
.
t = t1 +
(c2t21+cχ−c
2t21)
1
2
c
= t1 +
√
χ
c
.
Notice that we're interested just in positive values of t2.
Finally, I can measure the area below the function, according to the values that it takes, using
again an integral as:
´ t1+√χc
t1
[−c(t− t1)2 + χ]dt =
´ t1+√χc
t1
(−ct2 + 2ctt1 − ct21 + χ)dt
=
[
−c t
3
3
− ctt21 + ct1t2 + χt
]t=t1+√χc
t=t1
=
[
−c t1+
√
χ
c
3
− ct21(t1 +
√
χ
c
) + ct1(t1 +
√
χ
c
)2 + χ(t1 +
√
χ
c
) + c
t31
3
+ ct31 − ct31 + χt1
]
=
[
−c t1+
√
χ
c
3
− ct21(t1 +
√
χ
c
) + ct1(t1 +
√
χ
c
)2 + χ(t1 +
√
χ
c
) + c
t31
3
+ χt1
]
.
I can also continue to solve it by substitution (i.e. assuming t1 +
√
χ
c = x but things won't be
reduced in a easier form. A good calculator as Matlab is able to compute it. By the way now we
can measure the amount of losses: obviously these depend on the magnitude of c and the level of
χ that is reached by the government.
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5.3 Detrending the model
Starting from eqn. (6) that is HBC we proceed detrending in order to obtain an equation for the
capital accumulation:
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + RtΠtBt−1 = Bt + Yt
Then we plug the values of wt and Qt and what we get is:
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 = Bt + Yt (5.1)
that can be re-written as:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + (AtLαt K1−αt )− Ct −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 +Bt (5.2)
Supposing that the trend in the capital growth rate is described by:
Gr =
Grt+1
Grt
(1 + grt ) (5.3)
Now we start detrending as follows:
Kt+1
Grt+1
Grt+1
Grt
= (1− δ)Kt
Grt
+
At
Grt
Lαt
Gα,rt
K1−αt
G
(1−α),r
t
− Ct
Grt
− RtBt−1
Πt
1
Grt−1
+
Bt
Grt
(5.4)
Grkt+1 = (1− δ)kt + l̂αt k1−αt −
Rt
Πt
bt−1 + bt − ct
(1 + gr)kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + l̂αt k1−αt −
Rt
Πt
bt−1 + bt − ct
(1 + gr)
k
y
= (1− δ)k
y
+
y
y
− Rb
Πy
+
b
y
− c
y
(1 + gr)
k
y
= (1− δ)k
y
+ 1− Rb
Πy
+
b
y
− c
y
(gr + δ)
k
y
= 1 +
b
py
(1− R
Π
)− c
y
(5.5)
And using the fact that:
R = 1 + r =
[
(1− α)a
(
l
k
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
1 + r =
[
(1− α)A
(
L
K
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
A
(
L
K
)α
=
(1 + r)− (1− δ)
(1− α) =
(
r + δ
1− α
)
so it follows that:
y
k
=
r + δ
1− α
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and consequently:
k
y
=
1− α
r + δ
so we can plug it inside eqn. (5.6) and we obtain:
(gr + δ)
1− α
r + δ
= 1 +
b
py
(1− R
Π
)− c
y
c
y
= 1− (gr + δ)1− α
r + δ
+
b
py
(1− R
Π
) (5.6)
Now using parameters according to Campbell (1994):
gr = 0.005
α = 0.333
while for the interest rate we refer to Lucke and Wurzel (2011):
r = 0.04
setting δ = 0.036 according to literature and normalizing prices in the unit simplex, eqn. (5.6)
becomes:
c
y
= 1− (0.041)(0.667)
(0.076)
− 0.036 b
y
c
y
= 1− 0.36− 0.036(0.9) = 0.60
using data taken from Datastream (2011) we can approximate the bond to GDP ratio as by = 0.9
and we obtain as consumption to GDP ratio cy = 0.60 .
Now we start detrending the Euler equation:
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt
[
C
− 1
σ
t+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
that can be re-written as:
C
− 1
σ
t = βEt
[
C
− 1
σ
t+1
[(1−α)(At+1Lαt+1K
−α
t+1)+(1−δ)]
Π
]
we start detrending getting rid of ination as:
C
− 1
σ
t
G
(− 1
σ
),r
t
= βEt
 C
− 1
σ
t+1
G
(− 1
σ
),r
t+1
G
(− 1
σ
),r
t+1
G
(− 1
σ
),r
t
[
(1− α)At+1
(
Lαt+1
Kαt+1
)
Gα,rt+1
Gα,rt+1
+ (1− δ)
] (5.7)
ct = βEt
{
ct+1G
(− 1
σ
),r
[
(1− α)at+1
(
lt+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]}
(5.8)
where:
·
[
(1− α)at+1
(
lt+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
is the gross return to capital (that is equal to Rt+1),
· (1− α)at+1
lαt+1
kαt+1
is the rental rate on capital (that is equivalent to Qt+1).
Since at the steady state ct = ct+1 ,
so it follows that eqn.(5.8) can be re-written as:
βEt
(
G(−
1
σ
),rR
)
= 1 (5.9)
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or, explicitating for the intertemporal discount factor:
β? =
1
G(−
1
σ
),rR
(5.10)
and it turns out to be:
β? = 0.956
Detrending eqn. (1.24) we get:
L
− 1
η
t
G
− 1
η
,r
t
= βEt
 L−
1
η
t+1
G
− 1
η
,r
t+1
G
− 1
η
,r
t+1
G
− 1
η
,r
t
(1− τ lt)
(1− τ lt+1)
At
(
Kt
Lt
)1−α
At+1
(
Kt+1
Lt+1
)1−α Grt+1Grt
G
(α−1),r
t+1
G
(α−1),r
t
G
(1−α),r
t+1
G
(1−α),r
t
[
(1− α)At+1
(
Lt+1
Kt+1
)α 1
Grt+1
Gα,rt+1
Gα,rt+1
+ (1− δ)
]
(5.11)
l
− 1
η
t = βEt
l−
1
η
t+1G
− 1
η
,r
t T
at
(
kt
lt
)1−α
at+1
(
kt+1
lt+1
)1−αR
 (5.12)
where T =
(1−τ lt)
(1−τ lt+1)
.
Since at the steady state:
· l−
1
η
t = l
− 1η
t+1 ,
· τ lt = τ lt+1 ⇒ 1− τ lt = 1− τ lt+1 ⇒ T = 1 ,
· at = at+1 ,
· lα−1t = lα−1t+1 ,
· k1−αt = k1−αt+1 ,
·
[
(1− α)
(
l̂t+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]
= R = 1 + r
then the detrended equation for labor can be re-written in the following terms:
βEt
{
G
− 1
η
,r
t
[
(1− α)at+1
(
lt+1
kt+1
)α
+ (1− δ)
]}
= 1 (5.13)
so that:
βEt
{
G
− 1
η
,r
t R
}
= 1
β◦ =
1
G
− 1
η
,r
t R
(5.14)
that means that the intertemporal discount factor of each household depends on gross return to
capital and the magnitude of the trend inside our economy. From the resource constraint of the
government we want to obtain the public expenditure to GDP ratio:
Gt = (Bt −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1) + (1− ϕt)Tt − s(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − Bt)z
Gt = (1− ϕt)Tt + Bt −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − s(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − Bt)z
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Gt = (1− ϕt)Tt + Bt −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − s(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − Bt)z
Gt = (1− ϕt)Tt + Bt −
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − sz(
Rt
Πt
Bt−1 − Bt)
gt = (1− ϕt)tt + (1 + sz)
[
bt −
Rtbt−1
Πt
]
g
y
= (1− ϕ)
t
y
+
b
y
[1 + zs]−
Rb
Πy
[1 + zs]
Now substituting for capital to GDP ratio as before, and plugging inside values of the bond to
GDP ratio we can get the nal expression for government public expenditure (g) to income ratio;
as expenses on burocracy, transfers and subsidies:
g
y
=
t
y
(1 − ϕ) +
b
y
(1 + sz)(1 −
R
Π
) (5.15)
so that for z=0:
g
y
= (0.85)0.45 − 0.036(0.9)(1 + sz) ≈ 0.36
and for z=0 and no tax evasion (i.e. ϕ = 0):
g
y
= 0.45 − 0.036(0.9)(1 + sz) ≈ 0.42
while for z=1, s=0.05:
g
y
= (0.85)0.45 − 0.036(0.9)(1 + 0.05) ≈ 0.35
while for z=1, s=0.05 and no tax evasion (i.e. ϕ = 0):
g
y
= 0.45 − 0.036(0.9)(1 + 0.05) ≈ 0.43
Both if there is a default or not, the level of public expenditure will be:
g
y
= 0.382 − 0.032(1 + sz)
.
At the steady state this ts pretty well to a real world economy. The only thing to notice is that the
level of public expenditure is lower than that of RBC literature, just because we're considering tax
evasion as percentage of taxes that are unpaid by households, both on capital and labor market.
Detrending the Euler equation of the government:
G−γt = βEt
[
G−γt+1
Rt+1
Πt+1
]
−
sz
(1 + sz)
+ β
sz
(1 + sz)
Et
(
Rt+1
Πt+1
)
(5.16)
G−γt = βEt
[
Rt+1
Πt+1
(
G−γt+1 +
sz
(1 + sz)
)]
−
sz
(1 + sz)
(5.17)
we start de-trending as follows getting rid of ination just for this moment:
G−γt
G−γ,rt
= βEt
{[
(1− α)At+1
Gα,rt
Lαt+1
Gα,rt+1
K−αt+1
G−α,rt+1
+ (1− δ)
](
G−γt+1
G−γ,rt+1
G−γt+1
G−γ,rt
+
szPt
(1 + sz)
)}
− szPt
(1 + sz)
(5.18)
it follows that:
gt = βEt
{
Rt+1
(
gt+1G
−γ,r +
sz
(1 + sz)
)}
− sz
(1 + sz)
(5.19)
where clearly the government faces the same interest rates of households.
Given that at the steady state gt = gt+1:
1 +
sz
(1 + sz)gt
= βEt
{
Rt+1
(
G−γ,r +
sz
(1 + sz)gt
)}
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β/ =
1 + szg(1+sz)
R
{
G−γ,r + szg(1+sz)
}
For a non-default case the intertemporal discount factor is the same as for households. The gov-
ernment discount factor is decreasing when the gross interest rate arise and for a default scenario
it increases because of losses. Provision of public goods will be more costly for the government and
the old level of public provision cannot be sustained at all.
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